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Resumen 
 
En un modelo muy estilizado de crecimiento endógeno -con contaminación y actividades 
privadas de reducción de contaminación (abatement) y sin externalidades en producción-, 
mostramos que el gobierno tiene la posibilidad de explotar la existencia de Efectos Laffer 
Dinámicos para obtener un Doble Dividendo como resultado de una reforma impositiva 
medioambiental. Dicha reforma garantiza, además, el cumplimiento de un compromiso previo 
del gobierno consistente en proporcionar una senda predeterminada de transferencias de suma 
fija a los consumidores.  
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externalidades medioambientales, impuestos medioambientales, crecimiento endógeno, Efecto 
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Abstract 
 
In a very stylized endogenous growth economy with pollution and private abatement activities 
and without any production externality, we show that the government may exploit dynamic 
Laffer effects to achieve a double dividend through an environmental tax reform, while 
fulfilling its commitment to provide an exogenously specified sequence of expenditures in the 
form of lump-sum transfers to consumers. 
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1 Introduction
A green tax reform -consisting of increasing an environmental tax and devoting the pro-
ceeds to decrease a distortionary tax- is said to yield the strong version of a double dividend
if it is able to achieve an increase in welfare from environmental amenities (the so-called
green dividend) as well as from private commodities (the so-called blue dividend) [Goulder
(1995)]. A general principle for the double dividend to arise is a pre-existing inefficiency
in the tax system on non-environmental as well as in environmental grounds. In previ-
ous research, a relatively inefficient tax system on commodities or productive factors is
considered to distort agents’ decisions, taking the competitive equilibrium allocation away
from that solving the planner’s problem. This literature exploits a cross-sectional type
of tax inefficiency [Ulph (1992), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995), Proost and van Regemorter (1995) or Parry and Bento (2000)
consider a static framework, while Bovenberg and Goulder (1996, 1997), Bovenberg and
de Mooij (1997), or Heijdra et al. (2006) use dynamic general equilibrium models].
The type of economic structures in which enhancing the efficiency of the tax system
as a revenue-raising device has been shown in the literature to lead to a double dividend,
incorporate a relatively complex combination of tax structure and economic externalities,
which could give the impression that there might be little chance of achieving a double
dividend. On the contrary, our main contribution is to show that the double dividend
can arise in a simple framework, under a linear technology in which substitution between
inputs is precluded, and without any need to introduce an environmental externality in
1
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production.1 The new channel for a double dividend is the correction of a pre-existing
intertemporal inefficiency of the tax system, emerging from the possibility of obtaining a
non-environmental welfare gain by changing the time-profile of tax revenues.
Given a time path for environmental taxes, there exists an intertemporal inefficiency
in income taxes whenever it is possible to finance the same trajectory of government
expenditures with a lower sequence of income tax rates. That possibility exploits the
standard negative dependence of the growth rate on the income tax rate in endogenous
growth economies. Reducing the income tax rate in an economy on the upward sloping
segment of the static Laffer curve will lower revenues. If the government maintains its
expenditures as planned, it will have to issue some debt following the tax reform. The
increased growth after the income tax cut may, however, allow for eventually retiring the
stock of debt outstanding without the need to raise income taxes at any future period,
possibly leading to higher non-environmental welfare than under the initial tax structure.
We think of a government considering the possible inefficiency of the current tax struc-
ture as a way to finance the sequence of planned expenditures. Specifically, a government
having an environmental tax as a second fiscal instrument may design dynamically feasible
green tax reforms, those that consist of increasing the environmental tax and decreasing
the income tax in such a way that the implied higher future revenues may allow for even-
tually retiring the debt issued to finance the single-period budget deficits that may arise as
a consequence of the tax reform.2 For that to be possible, the present value of current and
1
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), the closer reference to our work, obtain the double dividend only
when the positive externality of environmental quality on productivity is large enough, compared with the
production elasticity of pollution as a rival input in production.
2
Heijdra et al. (2006) study the double dividend hypothesis in an overlapping-generations model
without endogenous growth, under a debt financing policy. At a difference of our model, the time path
2
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future revenues under the new tax structure must be at the time of the tax reform at least
as large as the present value of current and future expenditures. Our goal is to examine
the possibility that, by reducing the cross-sectional and the intertemporal inefficiencies of
the tax system simultaneously, this type of reforms may lead to a double dividend.
We consider an AK economy without any production externality. A negative pollution
externality in preferences leads to the need for abatement activities, which are carried
out by the firms. Abatement is assumed to be a private good which enables firms to
increase output without causing more pollution. The government has a planned time path
for lump-sum transfers3 to consumers. The lump-sum nature of government expenditures
excludes the possibility of having the positive stimulus that would arise from a positive
externality in production, as in Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997).
The possibility to obtain the blue dividend as a result of the tax reform depends on the
relative size of: i) the initial reduction on private consumption, because of a crowding-out
effect from investment and abatement, and ii) the stimulus on economic growth. On the
other hand, the green dividend depends on: i) the relative values of the elasticities of
pollution with respect to capital and abatement, and ii) the growth stimulus of the tax
reform. The effects of a dynamically feasible green reform on economic growth, initial tax
revenues and the interest rate are indeterminate a priori, since they are affected in opposite
for debt is exogenously given, and it is used to redistribute the gains from environmental taxes across
generations.
3
The path of pre-committed transfers can be justified in line with Leeper and Yang (2006, page 2):
"While is not uncommon for the [Joint Commitee on Taxation of US] Congress to cut transfers payments
when faced with revenue shortfalls [due to tax cuts], the federal government frequently resorts to borrowing
instead, postponing the inevitable adjustments in spendings or taxes. The federal debt-GDP ratio climbed
from 57.4% in 2001 to 65.7% in 2005 (estimate from Economic Report of the President (2005)), partially
due to the series of tax cuts introduced since 2001."
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direction by the decrease in the income tax rate and the increase in the environmental tax.
It will be more difficult to obtain a dynamically feasible reform the larger the implied
decrease in initial tax revenues (because the initial deficits will be larger), the lower the
increase in growth (because the increase in the future tax base will be lower) and the larger
the raise in interest rates (because the cost of repaying the debt will also be larger).
It is not possible to characterize analytical expressions for these cross-effects even in a
simple model economy, so that numerical analysis is needed to analyze the possibility of
obtaining a double dividend as result of the tax reform. To this end, the main parameters
of the model are calibrated according to stylized facts of actual economies. We obtain a
wide range of dynamically feasible green tax reforms that yield the double dividend, even
under a given ceiling for debt as a proportion of output. This is important for actual
economic policy making, as it is illustrated by the tight restrictions on public indebtedness
imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact for the European Union. A sensitivity analysis
of the results to changes in parameter values is also carried out. Finally, we show that if
the reform leading to the Pigouvian, first-best, tax structure is dynamically feasible and
generates a double dividend, then it is the second-best tax reform.
We describe the model economy in section 2. In section 3, we define the proposed
green tax reforms. In section 4, we simulate the model and explore the results regarding
the possibility of achieving a double dividend. The paper ends with some conclusions.
4
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2 The Model
The model economy consists of a large number of infinitely-lived identical households, a
single firm and a government. There is no uncertainty in the model. The representative
household obtains income each period from interest on savings as well as from transfers
received from the government. We assume that population does not grow and, without loss
of generality, we normalize its size to one. Hence, variables in the model can be regarded
as economy-wide aggregates, or in per capita terms. Household’s utility depends positively
on consumption and negatively on aggregate pollution: U(C
t
, P
t
) =
(CtP−η
t
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
, where
C
t
, P
t
are the levels of consumption and pollution, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and η > 0 is the weight of pollution in utility. This utility function
is standard in models with environmental externalities (see Smulders and Gradus (1993),
Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994), or Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), among others).
The household chooses the levels of consumption (C
t
) and wealth (W
t
) that maximize
the discounted utility function,
∫
∞
0
e−θt U(C
t
, P
t
) dt, subject to a sequence of budget
constraints, W˙
t
= (1 − τ) r
t
W
t
+ T
t
+ π
t
− C
t
, given W
0
, ∀t ∈ [0,∞) , where θ denotes
the subjective rate of time discount. The return on wealth is r
t
, which is subject to a
proportional tax rate τ , that can be interpreted as an assets income tax. T
t
are lump-sum
transfers received from the government, and π
t
are dividends received by the representative
household as owner of the firm. The household takes the aggregate level of pollution as
given.
Solving the household’s optimization problem leads to the Keynes-Ramsey rule:
5
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σ
C˙
t
C
t
+ η(1− σ)
P˙
t
P
t
= [r
t
(1− τ )− θ] , (1)
that determines optimal consumption over time for a given set of tax rates. The usual
transversality constraint guaranteeing non-explosive trajectories applies: lim
t→∞
e−θtλ
t
W
t
= 0,
where λ
t
is the Lagrange multiplier for the time t household’s budget constraint.
On the other hand, firms produce the single good in the economy using only physical
capital (K
t
). We assume that the technology is linear (Rebelo (1991))4: Y
t
= AK
t
, where
A denotes the level of technology. Environmental pollution is regarded as a side product of
the production process, and it is increasing in the level of output. Aggregate pollution P
t
is a public "bad" which can be reduced by means of abatement activities Z
t
which, in turn,
consume some output. When abatement activities increase, the stock of capital pollutes
less. We assume that P
t
and Z
t
are both flow variables, so that abatement activities must
be renewed each period. The pollution function is:
P
t
= K
χ
1
t
Z
−χ
2
t
, (2)
where χ
1
, χ
2
> 0 are the elasticities of P
t
with respect to physical capital and the abatement
activity, respectively. The firm must pay a pollution tax τ
P,t
according to the level of
pollution P
t
.
For simplicity, we assume that the rate of depreciation of physical capital is zero (in line
4
Despite the lack of realism of an AK technology, we use it because its simplicity precludes substitution
among productive factors, making more difficult to achieve a double dividend. Our goal is precisely to see
whether a double dividend can arise even in such a simple framework.
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with Agell and Persson (2001)). Therefore, letting I
t
denote private investment, capital
stock accumulates at the rate K˙
t
= I
t
. New output may be transformed into capital, but
this process involves adjustment costs. The cost of investment faced by the firm is Ψ(I
t
,
K
t
) =
(
1 + φ
2
I
t
K
t
)
I
t
, where φ ≥ 0 is the adjustment cost parameter (in line with Lucas
(1967), Gould (1968) and Treadway (1969)).
The firm maximizes the present value of current and future dividends:
Max
{I
t
,Z
t
}
∫
∞
0
e−
∫
t
0
r
s
ds
[
AK
t
− Z
t
− τ
P,t
P
t
−
(
1 +
φ
2
I
t
K
t
)
I
t
]
dt
subject to K˙
t
= I
t
, and P
t
= K
χ
1
t
Z
−χ
2
t
, given K
0
, with first-order conditions:
1 = χ
2
τ
P,t
P
t
Z
t
, (3)
r
t
=
1
1 + φs
t
[
A− χ
1
τ
P,t
P
t
K
t
+
φ
2
s2
t
+ φs˙
t
]
, (4)
where s
t
≡ I
t
/K
t
= K˙
t
/K
t
is the investment to capital ratio, as well as the rate of growth
rate of physical capital. Condition (3) equates the marginal cost to the marginal benefit
to the firm of abatement activities, the latter coming from the reduction in tax payments
because of lower pollution. Equation (4) is the arbitrage condition that equates the interest
rate to the rate of return on the stock of capital.
Finally, at any point in time the government makes decisions on expenditures, taxation
and financing, which are subject to its flow budget constraint:
7
13
B˙
t
+ τ r
t
W
t
+ τ
P,t
P
t
= T
t
+ r
t
B
t
, (5)
which asserts that the government deficit, that is, the aggregate of lump sum transfers (T
t
)
and interest payments on outstanding debt (r
t
B
t
), net of tax receipts (τ r
t
W
t
+ τ
P,t
P
t
),
must be financed by issuing additional debt (B˙
t
).
2.1 The competitive equilibrium
Definition 1 Given a fiscal policy {τ , τ
P,t
, T
t
, B
t
}∞
t=0
, a competitive equilibrium for this
economy is a set of allocations {C
t
,W
t
,K
t
, Z
t
, I
t
}∞
t=0
and a price system {r
t
}∞
t=0
such that:
i) {C
t
,W
t
}∞
t=0
maximize the household utility subject to her budget constraint, taking {W
0
}
as given; ii) {K
t
, Z
t
, I
t
}∞
t=0
satisfy the intertemporal maximization conditions, iii) house-
hold’s wealth is equal to the aggregate of physical capital and the stock of debt outstanding
(W
t
= K
t
+B
t
, ∀t), iv) the government budget constraint is satisfied, and v) {C
t
, I
t
, Z
t
}∞
t=0
satisfy the global constraint of resources:
(
1 +
φ
2
I
t
K
t
)
I
t
+ C
t
+ Z
t
= AK
t
. (6)
A balanced growth path (BGP from now) is a competitive equilibrium along which
{K
t
, Z
t
, I
t
, C
t
} , as well as the revenues from the pollution tax, all grow at a constant
rate γ. Therefore, the environmental tax revenues are a constant percentage of output,
τ¯
P
≡ τ
P,t
P
t
/Y
t
.5 The BGP can then be characterized by the system of equations:
5
Along a balanced growth path, P
t
will grow at a rate (χ
1
− χ
2
)γ, while τ
P,t
will grow at a rate
[1− (χ
1
− χ
2
)]γ.
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Z
t
K
t
= Aχ
2
τ¯
P
, (7)
r =
1
1 + φγ
[
A(1− χ
1
τ¯
P
) +
φ
2
γ2
]
, (8)
K˙
t
K
t
=
Z˙
t
Z
t
=
C˙
t
C
t
= s = γ =
1
σ˜
[(1− τ )r − θ] , (9)
C
t
K
t
= A(1− χ
2
τ¯
P
)−
(
1 +
φ
2
γ
)
γ, (10)
P
t
= P
0
e(χ1−χ2)γt = K
χ
1
−χ
2
0
(Aχ
2
τ¯
P
)−χ2 e(χ1−χ2)γt, (11)
where σ˜ ≡ σ+(χ
1
− χ
2
) η(1−σ), which reduces to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of consumption when pollution does not enter in the utility function or
under the standard assumption in the literature that χ
1
= χ
2
. We assume that τ¯
P
< 1/χ
1
,
because it guarantees that the interest rate is positive in the absence of adjustment costs
(see (8)). This condition on τ¯
P
always holds under empirically plausible values of χ
1
.
In spite of the presence of adjustment costs, the next proposition shows that the same
condition guaranteeing a positive interest rate also implies that the BGP lacks any tran-
sitional dynamics.
Proposition 1 Under condition σ˜ > 1−τ
2
: i) There exists a positive interest rate along the
BGP, and ii) The solution to the competitive equilibrium lacks any transitional dynamics.
Proof: see appendix.
We will only consider parameterizations with σ˜ > 1, guaranteeing that the after-tax
real interest rate is larger than the rate of economic growth6, and consequently, that time
6
From (9), we have that (1− τ)r > γ ⇔ θ > (1− σ˜)γ, which always holds if σ˜ > 1.
9
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aggregate utility is bounded. From Proposition 1, this condition also guarantees that the
competitive equilibrium takes the form of a BGP7. This condition will hold under the
standard assumptions σ > 1, χ
2
= χ
1
. It will also hold if χ
1
> χ
2
, provided the difference
between both parameters is small.8
3 Green tax reform experiments
In our model economy, higher environmental taxes will tend to reduce after-tax produc-
tivity, lowering the incentives for capital accumulation and negatively influencing long-run
growth, while the income tax cut will yield the opposite effects. Hence, the final effect on
growth of the tax reform is indeterminate. The following proposition shows9 that if the
green tax reform is designed to leave a balanced budget the first period it is introduced10
(this is the standard tax reform considered in the literature), growth will permanently
decrease and hence, the blue dividend will not emerge. Furthermore, since we assume
that the government has a pre-committed path of transfers, such tax reforms would not
be feasible: the new path for revenues would fall every period below the path of transfers
to consumers.
Proposition 2 In our model economy, a green tax reform that leaves a balanced budget
the first period it is introduced, will permanently reduce growth. Proof: see appendix.
7
It is straightforward to show that if σ˜ > 1, the BGP of the planner’s problem also lacks any transitional
dynamics (applying proof of prop. 1 to planner solution).
8
Pollution would decrease over time regardless of the environmental tax policy implemented whenever
χ
1
< χ
2
, a case which we exclude from analysis.
9
The analytical result is available only for the case without adjustment costs (φ = 0), although it can
also be seen to arise numerically for φ > 0.
10
The larger revenues from the environmental source -due to the pollution tax rise- exactly offset the
lower revenues from non-environmental sources -due to the assets income tax cut.
10
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This result shows that achieving a blue dividend in our model economy would require
a tax reform unavoidably leading to an initial fall in revenues.11 Since expenditures are
given, the consequence of such tax reform is an initial budget deficit. Hence, to achieve
a double dividend the government must be allowed to issue some debt. Only then could
a financially feasible tax reform be able to increase economic growth, while achieving a
green and a blue dividend simultaneously. Given a time path of pre-committed government
expenditures, a green tax reform is said to be dynamically feasible if it leads to a tax mix
of income and environmental tax rates satisfying the present value government budget
constraint. These are tax reforms leading to an increase in the base by enough to allow
for eventually retiring the debt that was issued to cover the budget deficits produced at
the time of the tax reform.12
The possibility to obtain the blue dividend as a result of the reform depends on the
effect on the rate of growth, as well as on the effect on private consumption at the period of
the reform. The level of consumption falls immediately after that tax reform because of a
crowding-out effect from abatement and investment. On the other hand, the green dividend
depends on the elasticity of pollution with respect to capital relative to the elasticity of
pollution with respect to abatement, as well as on the effect on growth.13 As mentioned
11
To enhance growth, the income tax cut must be larger -for a given environmental tax rise- than in the
situation considered in proposition 2, implying that revenues will fall with respect to the baseline case.
12
The definition of a dynamically feasible green tax reform above relates to what is known in the
literature as a dynamic Laffer effect. Such effect may arise in endogenous growth economies in which the
rate of growth of output depends negatively from income tax rates. An income tax cut, accompanied
of some debt issuing can then be self-financed because of the implied increase in the future tax base,
as explained above. [See Ireland (1994), Pecorino (1995), Milesi-Ferreti and Roubini (1998), Agell and
Persson (2001) or Novales and Ruiz (2002), all of them for non-environmental economies].
The initial need for debt financing shows that our tax reforms initially lead to lower fiscal revenues,
which are eventually compensated over time. In that sense, we could also talk of dynamic Laffer effects.
13
If χ
1
= χ
2
, then P
t
= (Aχ
2
τ¯
P
)
−χ
2
, and the environmental gain is ensured for any tax reform that
consists of increasing the pollution tax rate. But if χ
1
> χ
2
and the growth rate increases after the reform,
11
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in the introduction, it is not possible to characterize analytical expressions for these cross-
effects even in our simple economy, so that numerical analysis is needed to analyze the
possibility of obtaining a double dividend as result of the tax reform.
We define the green and blue dividends in terms of welfare gains, similarly to definitions
used in the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models (Chamley (1981), Lucas
(1987), Cooley and Hansen (1992) or Judd (1997)). We start by computing the total welfare
effects (TWE) associated to a green tax reform, measured by the change in consumption
(as a percentage of output) that an individual would require each period to be as well off
under the initial situation as under the new tax structure. To isolate the blue dividend
(BD), we also compute the change in consumption needed to have the same level of
welfare under the initial and the new tax structure, this time assuming that the time path
of pollution remains the same as before the tax reform. We compute the green dividend
(GD) similarly, assuming in this case that the time path of consumption is the same as
before the tax reform. The decomposition of TWE into BD and GD is nonlinear, so that
TWE can not be obtained by adding BD and GD. See appendix for more details. As in
the literature on dynamic Laffer effects, the set of dynamically feasible tax reforms must
be numerically characterized. Hence, the analysis of double dividend is also numerical.
the pollution path starts below the path before the reform -due to the incentive on abatement activities
resulting from the increase in the pollution tax rate-. After a finite number of periods, the level of pollution
will exceed the level of pollution corresponding to the initial tax mix due to the increase in growth. The
sign of the discounted effect on environmental welfare must be numerically computed.
12
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3.1 Tax experiment
For simplicity, we take the ratio of environmental tax revenues to output as the policy
variable.14 Given an initial tax mix (τ 0,τ¯ 0
P
), we assume the economy to be initially on a
BGP, with a rate of growth γ
0
for all variables. Taking into account that τ¯
P
≡ τ
P,t
P
t
/Y
t
,
W
t
= K
t
+ B
t
, into (5) and the fact that the government is not issuing debt before the
tax reform (B
t,0
= 0, ∀t), we can write the path for government transfers before the tax
reform, T
t,0
, as:
T
t,0
= (Aτ¯
P
+ τr)K
t,0
= (Aτ¯
P
+ τr)K
0
eγ0t. (12)
We assume that the government is committed to guarantee such transfers path (T
t,0
),
which must be taken into account when the tax mix is designed. In this context, the
government considers the possibility that the current tax structure could be inefficient, in
the sense that a tax reform might exist that could achieve a double dividend. Such reform
will consist of raising the environmental tax (τ¯ 1
P
> τ¯ 0
P
) at the same time than lowering the
income tax (τ 1 < τ 0). Let us denote by γ
0
the growth rate before the reform and by γ
1
,
r
1
, K
t,1
the growth rate, the real interest rate and the trajectory for the stock of capital
after the green tax reform. We assume that the reform takes place at t = 0.
A green tax reform is dynamically feasible in our setup if the present value government
budget constraint holds. Using the terminal constraint for debt (lim
t→∞
e−(1−τ)rtB
t
= 0),
that will be the case if the present value of expenditures (
∫
∞
0
e−r1(1−τ
1
)tT
t,0
dt) is not larger
14
Since the stock of capital is predetermined, there is a one-to-one relationship between the environ-
mental tax rate and the ratio of the environmental tax revenue to output:
τ¯
P
=
(
χ
χ
2
/(1+χ
2
)
2
/A
)
K
χ
1
−1−χ
2
1+χ
2
t
τ
1
1+χ
2
P,t
.
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than the present value of revenues (
∫
∞
0
e−r1(1−τ
1
)t (Aτ¯ 1
P
+ τ 1r1)K
t,1
dt), i.e., if:
Aτ¯ 0
P
+ τ 0r
0
r
1
(1− τ 1)− γ
0
≤
Aτ¯ 1
P
+ τ 1r
0
r
1
(1− τ 1)− γ
1
. (13)
Among all such reforms, we only consider those satisfying the condition γ
1
≥ γ
0
; this
condition is necessary for the blue dividend to arise. Furthermore, together with σ˜ > 1, it
guarantees a finite present value for government revenues and expenditures15.
Since these reforms generate initial deficits, debt issuing is needed. A high stock of debt
outstanding, in terms of output, is not a problem in a deterministic economy like ours, but
for the sake of realism, we will limit our attention to tax reforms leading to a maximum
stock of debt below 60% of output (the limit imposed in the Stability and Growth Pact
of the European Union). To that end, we compute the time period at which the ratio of
stock of debt to output is largest (see appendix). The maximum stock of debt is
b
t
∗ =
T
0
[
e
((1−τ1)r
1
−γ
1
)t∗
−e
(γ
0
−γ
1
)t
∗
]
AK
0
[(1−τ
1
)r
1
−γ
0
]
−
(Aτ¯1
P
+τ
1
r
1)
[
e
((1−τ1)r
1
−γ
1
)t∗
−1
]
AK
0
[(1−τ
1
)r
1
−γ
1
]
, with
t∗ = −
ln [Ω]
(1− τ 1)r
1
− γ
0
, (14)
where Ω ≡
[
T
0
(1− τ 1)r
1
− γ
0
−
(Aτ¯ 1
P
+ τ 1r1)K
0
[(1− τ 1)r
1
− γ
1
]
]
[(1− τ 1)r
1
− γ
1
] [(1− τ 1)r
1
− γ
0
]
T
0
(γ
0
− γ
1
)
.
The range of parameter values for which (13) is satisfied cannot be analytically de-
termined. However, it is possible to evaluate numerically whether a proposed tax reform
satisfies (13) under specific values for the structural and policy parameters. Among them,
15
Since we only consider parameterizations for which σ˜ > 1, then r
1
(1 − τ
1
) − γ
1
> 0. As γ
0
≤ γ
1
,
then r
1
(1− τ
1
)− γ
0
> 0. Both conditions guarantee a finite present value for government revenues and
expenditures.
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we will pay special attention to those implying b
t
∗ ≤ 60%.
4 Simulation analysis
4.1 Parameterization and results
We simulate the model economy by choosing benchmark parameter values consistent with
stylized facts for actual economies. The tax rate on pollution before the reform is set
so that the environmental tax revenues to output ratio (τ¯ 0
P
) is 2.7%, the average value
reported for European Union (eu25) in Eurostat. The parameter χ
2
= 0.3704 is chosen
so that the abatement spending to output ratio replicates the 1% level observed for actual
economies (see statistics in Eurostat16). The initial income tax rate (τ
0
) is 23%. The
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ) is 1.1, and the parameters related
to pollution are η = 0.2, χ
1
= χ
2
(so that the level of pollution does not grow). The
adjustment cost parameter is φ = 3. Additionally, A = 0.0441 and θ = 0.0056 so that the
after-tax real rate of interest ((1− τ
0
)r
0
) is 3.2% and growth (γ
0
) is 2.4% per year, in line
with values usually reported for the US economy.17 Without loss of generality we assume
K
0
= 1.
For a given increase in the pollution tax, there is a certain range of cuts in the income
tax rate that can be used as part of a feasible tax reform in the sense of allowing for
16
PAC (Pollution Abatement and Control) expenditures by the private sector as a percentage of GDP
(OECD Report based on the 2002 questionnaire on PAC expenditure and revenues). See OECD (2003).
17
Note that when χ
1
= χ
2
, if (1−τ)r > 0 and γ > 0, then σ <
(1−τ)r
γ
is needed to guarantee θ > 0. That
limits considerably the range of values for σ. Not imposing any condition on interest rates or growth would
allow for a wider range of values for σ,but some of them would make more difficult to obtain dynamically
feasible green tax reforms (see Novales and Ruiz (2002), for a non-environmental economy).
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condition (13) to hold. The intuition is simple. If the income tax cut is too low, the
rate of growth decreases. If the income tax cut is too large, the initial deficit will be very
large, and condition (13) might fail to hold, even though the increase in growth will also
be remarkable. Therefore, there is a range of feasible income tax cuts, the lower limit of
that range fulfilling condition (13) as an equality, while the rest lead to a present value
budget surplus.
Dynamically feasible green tax reforms and double dividend
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Figure 1 shows the (τ 1, τ¯ 1
P
)-pairs resulting from dynamically feasible green tax reforms,
those satisfying (13) and γ
1
≥ γ
0
. The horizontal axis displays the environmental revenues
to output ratio after the reform, starting from τ¯ 0
P
= 2.7% (the calibrated level). The
vertical axis shows the income tax rate after the reform, with the initial tax, τ 0 = 23%,
as an upper bound. The upper limit of the shadowed area in Figure 1 corresponds to the
minimum income tax cut that it is dynamically feasible, for every pollution tax rate. The
lower limit of the shadowed area corresponds to the maximum income tax cut that yields,
for every pollution tax rate, a dynamically feasible reform. This region is open from the
left, not including the vertical axis, that corresponds to reforms leaving the environmental
16
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tax unaltered, because the green dividend then does not arise. There are dynamically
feasible green tax reforms with a rise in pollution tax higher than considered in figure 1,
but the double dividend is never present.
The larger the rise in the pollution tax, the larger the increase in environmental tax
revenues, so that a given income tax rate cut leads to a lower initial deficit, making easier
that the initial debt can be eventually retired. Hence, the lower limit of the shadowed area
is decreasing.
Since χ
1
= χ
2
in our benchmark parameterization, any feasible green tax reform in
Figure 1 achieves at least the green dividend (GD > 0), because the new pollution path
will always lie below the initial pollution path. Among the dynamically feasible green tax
reforms, only those inside the darker shadowed and the dotted areas display green tax
reforms that also yield a blue dividend. The difference between both regions is that the
dotted area contains feasible green tax reforms for which the maximum debt to output
ratio does not surpass 60% (that is, b
t
∗ ≤ 60%). The blue dividend is not present for
those reforms outside those two regions (the pale non-dotted area) because the initial fall
in consumption is large relative to the growth stimulus.
A double dividend with a highest level of public debt below 60% of output arises for
a wide range of green tax reforms: under the benchmark parameterization, the double
dividend can be obtained for levels of the environmental tax revenues to output ratio τ¯ 1
P
∈
(2.7%, 22.3%). Among them, the highest welfare gain is obtained for a green tax reform
changing taxes from the initial levels of τ 0 = 23%, τ 0
P
= 2.7% to: τ 1 = 5.6%, τ¯ 1
P
= 15%
(second-best tax reform constrained by the 60% debt ceiling), with: TWE = 11%, made
17
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up by a GD = 4.6% and a BD = 5.8%. The debt constraint is binding.
If we would not impose the 60% upper ceiling on public indebtedness, then we could
implement a dynamically feasible green tax reform with substantially larger welfare gains.
The green tax reform that yields the maximum welfare consists of changing tax rates form
their initial levels to: τ 1 = 3.9%, τ¯ 1
P
= 10.9% (non-constrained second-best tax reform),
with a total welfare gain: TWE = 14.3% (GD = 4.6% and BD = 8.7%), but with an
excessive stock of debt: b
t
∗ = 1557%.
We think of the Pigouvian tax mix in our framework as the tax scheme that eliminates
all tax distortions and externalities (that is, the first-best tax mix). In our model economy,
the Pigouvian tax mix will always involve a zero income tax and an environmental tax rate
which generates an environmental revenues to output ratio as the one computed in appen-
dix. For our parameterization, the Pigouvian environmental tax generates a pollution tax
revenues to output ratio equal to 4.4%. The reform leading to the Pigouvian tax mix is
not dynamically feasible, as it is shown in Figure 1 and hence, it is not implementable.
Implementing the Pigouvian level for the environmental tax and the lowest feasible income
tax, τ 1 = 14.8% (that is, the projection of the first-best tax mix on the lowest limit of the
dynamically feasible area) is not the second-best tax reform. In fact, the largest welfare
gain is obtained through a larger cut in the income tax (τ 1 = 3.9%) at the expense of a
larger pollution tax (τ¯ 1
P
= 10.9%). This reflects the fact that the environmental tax is less
distortionary as a revenue-raising device than the income tax.
Finally, Figure 1 allows us to quantify the pre-existing non-environmental inefficiency
of the tax system, in particular, the dynamic inefficiency of the time profile of income tax
18
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revenues. To that end, we maintain τ¯ 0
P
= 2.7%, and obtain the largest income tax cut
which is dynamically feasible (3.4 percentage points), leading to τ 1 = 19.6%. Such tax
cut achieves the largest welfare gain conditioned on τ¯ 0
P
= 2.7% (TWE = BD = 3.5%), a
measure of the dynamic inefficiency of the initial tax system on non-environmental grounds.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
In Table 1 we show that is possible to find a wide range of dynamically feasible tax
reforms yielding a double dividend. Furthermore, we display for every parameter case
the second-best tax reforms, that is, the reforms achieving the largest welfare gain, while
simultaneously satisfying the debt constraint (b
t
∗ ≤ 60%). The values of {A, θ, χ
2
} are
adjusted to guarantee that before the tax reform, the economy is characterized by an
after-tax rate of interest R
0
= (1 − τ
0
)r
0
= 3.2%, a growth rate γ
0
= 2.4% and an
abatement to output ratio equal to 1%. Hence, the sensitivity analysis is carried out for
the remaining parameters, {σ, φ, χ
1
}. We also change the levels of {τ
0
, γ
0
, R
0
} because
they affect the range of dynamically feasible reforms. We study the effects of changes in η
in table 2.
Table 1. Dynamically feasible tax reform yielding double dividend. Sensitivity Analysis  
 Double 
Dividend Range 
for 
P
τ  ( ),SB SBPτ τ  SBγ  SBTWE
 
SB
BD
 
SB
GD
 
Benchmark (2.7, 22.3) (15.0, 5.6) 2.9 11.0 4.6 5.8 
1.3σ =  (2.7, 19.9) (14.4, 7.4) 2.8 8.3 2.4 5.6 
0φ =  
(2.7, 22.2) (15.2, 6.1) 2.9 10.5 4.2 5.7 
1 2
0.5χ χ= >  
(2.7, 22.7) (15.3, 5.9) 2.8 9.4 3.7 5.2 
0
15%τ =  (2.7, 11.7) (10.2, 5.1) 2.6 4.0 0.2 3.8 
0
2%γ =  
(2.7, 17.6) (14.7, 7.3) 2.4 7.8 0.7 7.0 
0
4%R =  
(2.7, 16.8) (14.5, 7.3) 2.9 7.7 0.5 7.2 
Notes: i) Implementing any second-best tax reform, in column 2, leads to a maximum debt to output ratio of 60%; 
ii) SB≡Second-Best; iii) SBγ ≡Growth rate resulting from the second-best tax reform; iv) TWE, BD and GD  
are the welfare gains (total, blue and green) as a percentage of output (see definitions in appendix).  
v) Benchmark:
1 2
1.1; 3; 0.2; 0.3704;σ φ η χ χ= = = = = 0 00.0441; 0.0056; 23%; 2.7%
P
A θ τ τ= = = = ;
0 0
2.4%; 3.2%Rγ = = . 
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Column 1 of Table 1 displays the range for τ¯
P
for which the double dividend results.
In all the cases, the lower limit of the interval corresponds to the initial rate (τ¯ 0
P
= 2.7%),
obtained from Eurostat data. For example, for the benchmark case, we find that it is
possible to increase environmental revenues (as a percentage of output) from 2.7% up to
22.3%. It can be seen that this range is remarkably wide for any of the parameter cases
analyzed.
It is easier to obtain dynamically feasible tax reforms (and hence, the double dividend
area is wider) : i) the larger the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (lower σ), because
that increases the growth stimulus of an income tax cut18 and hence, increases the ex-
pansion of future tax base; ii) the larger the adjustment cost (φ), because the new stock
of capital will be productive at a slower rate, generating a lower after-taxes interest rate
and leading to a lower debt service; iii) when χ
1
> χ
2
, because the pollution path is then
increasing and hence, the environmental tax base is also increasing, allowing for larger
income tax cuts.
The key parameters conditioning the double dividend area are: the initial income tax
rate (τ
0
), the initial growth rate (γ
0
) and the initial after-tax interest rate (R
0
). A decrease
in τ
0
or γ
0
, or an increase in R
0
, would make more difficult to obtain dynamically feasible
reforms, and hence, would reduce the possibility to obtain the blue dividend. The lower the
initial income tax rate, the lower the possibility to obtain growth enhancing tax cuts and
to generate enough revenues to balance the present value government budget constraint.
Since θ is adjusted to replicate the calibrated growth rate, the lower the initial growth rate,
18
Note that for low values of σ, the reduction in the income tax rate increases the after tax interest rate,
with an even larger effect on growth (see (9)).
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the higher the discount rate θ. A larger θ makes harder to increase growth through tax
cuts, thus being more difficult to expand the future tax base. Finally, the larger the initial
interest rate, the larger the debt service after the reform and, hence, the more difficult the
repayment of outstanding debt.
Columns 2 to 6 displays for every parameterization, the second-best tax reform and
the associated growth rate, as well as the total welfare gain and its two components, the
blue and green dividends. In all cases, the debt constraint b
t
∗ ≤ 60% has been taken
into account and the second-best result implies that such constraint is always binding. In
general, the welfare gains are lower the narrower the double dividend area. With respect
to the composition of welfare gains, it can be seen that the blue dividend and the green
dividend are both sizeable. In the last three rows, in which the range of dynamically feasible
reforms is substantially narrower, the blue dividend is seriously harmed with respect to
the green dividend.
The objective of table 2 is twofold: i) analyzing how the results are affected by changes
in η ; ii) studying the second-best solution when the first-best solution is dynamically
feasible. To this end, the η parameter is crucial, since increments in it rise the Pigouvian
environmental tax rate, making easier that the Pigouvian tax mix falls inside the region
of dynamically feasible green tax reforms.
The first column shows whether the debt constraint is taken into account or not. The
second and third columns show the first-best and second-best tax mixes. The fourth column
displays the maximum level of debt reached under the second-best policy. Columns 5 to 8
show the growth rate and welfare measures corresponding to implementing the second-best
21
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tax reform. Finally, the last column includes the range of τ¯
P
yielding the double dividend.
Tabla 2. The first-best versus the second-best tax mix.  
 
Debt 
constraint 
 
( ),FB FB
P
τ τ  ( ),SB SB
P
τ τ  
*
t
b  
SBγ  SBTWE
 
SB
BD
 
SB
GD
 
Double 
Dividend 
Range for 
P
τ  
*
60%
t
b ≤  
(15.0, 5.6) 60% 2.9 11.0 4.6 5.8 
Benchmark 
0
0.2
23%
η
τ
=
=  Unconstrained 
(4.4, 0) 
(10.9, 3.9) 1557% 3.0 14.3 8.7 4.6 
(2.7, 22.3) 
*
60%
t
b ≤  
(18.6, 0.5) 60% 3.0 38.0 2.9 32.9 
0
0.8
23%
η
τ
=
=  
Unconstrained 
(17.1, 0) 
(17.1, 0) 217% 3.1 38.1 4.1 31.1 
(2.7, 22.3) 
*
60%
t
b ≤  
(10.8, 4.4) 60% 2.7 15.9 0.03 15.9 
0
0.7
15%
η
τ
=
=  
Unconstrained 
(15.8, 0) 
(11.7, 0) 659% 2.8 17.0 0.024 17.0 
(2.7, 11.7) 
Notes:  i) FB≡First-Best (Pigouvian);  SB≡Second-Best. ii) TWE, BD and GD are the welfare gains (total, blue and green) as a  
percentage of output (see definitions in appendix); iii) 
SBγ ≡Growth rate resulting from the second-best tax reform; iv) 
*
t
b  is the largest debt to 
output ratio on debt path generated by the green tax reform.  
iv) Benchmark:
1 2
1.1; 3; 0.2; 0.3704;σ φ η χ χ= = = = = 0 00.0441; 0.0056; 23%; 2.7%
P
A θ τ τ= = = = ;
0 0
2.4%; 3.2%Rγ = = . 
We obtain two remarkable findings: i) the η parameter does not have any effect on
the region of dynamically feasible green tax reforms nor on the region for double dividend
tax reforms. This is because when χ
1
= χ
2
, the balanced growth path does not depend
on η. However, this parameter will affect the welfare gain. The larger the environmental
concern, the larger the agents’ willingness to give up a non-environmental welfare gain in
favor of a larger environmental welfare gain, which is attained for a larger environmental
tax rate; and ii) if the reform leading to the first-best or Pigouvian tax mix is dynamically
feasible and generates a double dividend, then it is the second-best tax reform (see second
row, for η = 0.8, τ
0
= 23%, when the debt ceiling is not taken into account). If the reform
leading to the Pigouvian tax mix is dynamically feasible but it does not generate a double
dividend, then the second-best income tax rate will be zero, i.e., equal to the Pigouvian
income tax and the second-best environmental tax will be the largest level that generates
a double dividend, given that τSB = 0 (see third row, for η = 0.7, τ
0
= 15%, when the
debt constraint is not taken into account).
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5 Conclusions
An income tax system is said to be intertemporally inefficient whenever it is possible to
finance the same trajectory of government expenditures with a lower sequence of income tax
rates, potentially leading to a gain in non-environmental welfare. This type of inefficiency
has not been previously analyzed in environmental frameworks. A second, cross-sectional
type of tax inefficiency -widely exploited in the environmental literature- arises when a
relatively inefficient tax system on commodities or productive factors takes the competitive
equilibrium allocation away from that solving the planner’s problem. The contribution of
this paper is to show that there are situations in which the two types of inefficiency can
be corrected simultaneously.
That a double dividend can sometimes be achieved has already been shown in dynamic
economies when there is a sufficiently important negative externality of pollution in pro-
duction. We show in this paper that such a condition is not necessary for a double dividend
to arise. The reason is that an active public sector financing policy that uses debt issuing
in combination with tax revenues may easily allow for a higher income tax cut, with a
more important stimulus for future growth of the tax base.
Specifically, we have shown in a relatively simple model economy, under reasonable
values for the structural parameters and tax rates, that a government committed to a
given sequence of lump-sum transfers to the private sector can sometimes implement a
dynamically feasible green tax reform that allows for fulfilling its commitment to the private
sector while achieving a double dividend. Since the proposed reform includes debt issuing,
there is a shift in tax burden from the present to the future (outstanding debt is well-known
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to be equivalent to lump-sum taxes in a representative agent’s general equilibrium models
without uncertainty). This is justifiable from an environmental point of view: since present
generations bear the cost of the environmental reform while future generations benefit from
a cleaner environment, it seems fair that the former are compensated by a decrease of taxes
while the latter bear a larger tax burden.
Among the range of tax reforms leading to a double dividend, the one producing the
largest welfare gain could use an environmental tax above or below the environmental
Pigouvian level. We show that if the reform leading to the Pigouvian, first-best, tax
structure is dynamically feasible and generates a double dividend, then it is also the second-
best reform.
The implementation of our policy reform could seem very attractive in actual policy
making since: i) substituting debt for distortionary taxation should get a strong social
support for the green reform and, ii) the stock of debt outstanding as a consequence of
the proposed tax reform may be quite reasonable at each point in time, as a proportion of
output.
Introducing uncertainty in the economy would allow us to consider the effects on in-
terest payments and on consumers’ expectations of an increase in risk premium due to a
sizeable stock of government debt. The extent to which uncertainty makes more difficult
the possibility of achieving a double dividend is left for future research. Considering an
economic structure with a non-trivial transition to steady-state following a policy inter-
vention may significantly affect the possibility of obtaining a dynamic Laffer effect, and
hence, a double dividend, and it is also left as a possible extension of this research.
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7 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1:
i) Positive interest rate:
Let us denote ψ
1
≡ φ
σ˜
(1−τ)
(
1− 1−τ
2σ˜
)
, ψ
2
≡ 1+ φθ
σ˜
(
1−τ
σ˜
− 1
)
, and ψ
3
≡ A(1−χ
1
τ¯
P
)+
φθ
2
2σ˜
2
. Equations (9) and (8) can be collapsed into: ψ
1
r2 + ψ
2
r − ψ
3
= 0, a second degree
equation characterizing the interest rate along the BGP:
r =
−ψ
2
±
[
ψ2
2
+ 4ψ
1
ψ
3
]
1/2
2ψ
1
. (15)
Condition τ¯
P
< 1/χ
1
implies ψ
3
> 0, while σ˜ > 1−τ
2
implies ψ
1
> 0 and the square bracket
in the expression for r is positive. Then, expression (15) , taken with the positive sign,
yields a real, positive interest rate.
ii) The BGP lacks any transitional dynamics:
Using (1), (2), (3), (4), and τ¯
P
≡ τ
P,t
P
t
/Y
t
it can be shown that:
σ
(
C˙
t
C
t
−
K˙
t
K
t
)
+ σ˜s
t
=
1− τ
1 + φs
t
[
A(1− χ
1
τ¯
P
) +
φ
2
s2
t
+ φs˙
t
]
− θ. (16)
28
34
Using (6) together with K˙
t
= I
t
and (3) we get
(
C˙
t
C
t
−
K˙
t
K
t
)
= −
(1 + φs
t
)s˙
t
A(1− χ
2
τ¯
P
)−
(
1 + φ
2
s
t
)
s
t
. (17)
From (16) and (17): s˙
t
= Γ1(st)
Γ
2
(s
t
)
, where Γ
1
(s
t
) ≡ θ + σ˜s
t
− 1−τ
1+φs
t
[
A(1− χ
1
τ¯
P
) + φ
2
s2
t
]
and Γ
2
(s
t
) ≡ σ(1+φst)
A(1−χ
2
τ¯
P
)−(1+φ
2
s
t)st
+ (1−τ)φ
1+φs
t
.
Note that the steady state for s is stable if ∂s˙t
∂s
t
∣∣∣
s
t
=s
< 0. However,
∂s˙
t
∂s
t
∣∣∣∣
s
t
=s
=︸︷︷︸
note that Γ
1
(s)=0
σ˜ + φθ + φs (2σ˜ − (1− τ ))
(1 + φs)Γ
2
(s)
,
which is positive if σ˜ > 1−τ
2
. Therefore, only if s
t
grows at a constant rate can the transver-
sality condition be guaranteed to hold. Hence, the competitive equilibrium solution will
always be on the balanced growth path.
Proof of proposition 2.
We consider φ = 0. Let us denote by rev
t,0
and rev
t,1
the tax revenues before and after
the tax reform. Let us denote by (τ 0, τ¯ 0
P
) and (τ 1, τ¯ 1
P
) the tax mix before and after the
tax reform, where τ¯ 1
P
> τ¯ 0
P
. Let us denote by γ
0
and γ
1
the growth rate before and after
the reform. Note that, before the reform: T
t
= rev
t,0
, and rev
t,i
= (τ ir
i
+ τ¯ i
P
A)K
0
eγit,
where r
i
= A(1− χ
1
τ¯ i
P
), i = 0, 1, since φ = 0. We assume that the tax reform takes place
at t = 0. Hence, rev
0,0
= rev
0,1
⇔ τ 0r
0
+ τ¯ 0
P
A = τ 1r
1
+ τ¯ 1
P
A; so, given (τ 0, τ¯ 0
P
) and τ¯ 1
P
:
τ 1 =
τ 0(1− χ
1
τ¯ 0
P
) + τ¯ 0
P
− τ¯ 1
P
1− χ
1
τ¯ 1
P
. (18)
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From (9), γσ˜ = (1 − τ)r − θ. So, γ
0
− γ
1
> 0 ⇔ (1 − τ
0
)r
0
− (1 − τ
1
)r
1
> 0 ⇔
(1 − τ 0)(1 − χ
1
τ¯ 0
P
) − (1 − τ 1)(1 − χ
1
τ¯ 1
P
) > 0 ⇔ (1 − τ 0)(1 − χ
1
τ¯ 0
P
) − (1 − χ
1
τ¯ 1
P
) +
[τ 0(1− χ
1
τ¯ 0
P
) + τ¯ 0
P
− τ¯ 1
P
] > 0 ⇔ (τ¯ 1
P
− τ¯ 0
P
) (1 + χ
1
) > 0 where we have used (18) and
τ¯ 1
P
> τ¯ 0
P
.
Characterizing the largest stock of debt
We compute the stock of debt at time t asB
t
=
∫
t
0
e−(1−τ
1
)r
1
(t−s) [T
s,0
− (Aτ¯ 1
P
+ τ 1r1)K
s,1
] ds,
which, as a percentage of output, is
b
t
=
T
0
[
e((1−τ
1
)r
1
−γ
1
)t − e(γ0−γ1)t
]
AK
0
[(1− τ 1)r1 − γ
0
]
−
(Aτ¯ 1
P
+ τ 1r1)
[
e((1−τ
1
)r
1
−γ
1
)t − 1
]
AK
0
[(1− τ 1)r1 − γ
1
]
. (19)
Maximizing b
t
with respect to t , we get (14). Then, the maximum stock of debt,
denoted by b
t
∗, would be obtained by substitution of (14) in (19).
Measures of total welfare gain and blue and green dividend
Let γ
0
and γ
1
be the growth rates before and after the reform. Let C
t,0
= C
0,0
eγ0t ,
P
t,0
= P
0,0
e(χ1−χ2)γ0t and Y
t,0
= Y
0,0
eγ0t be the paths for consumption, pollution and output
under the initial policy (τ 0, τ¯ 0
P
), and C
t,1
= C
0,1
eγ1t and P
t,1
= P
0,1
e(χ1−χ2)γ1t be the paths
followed by consumption and pollution under the new policy (τ 1, τ¯ 1
P
), where, from (10),
C
0,i
=
(
A(1− χ
2
τ¯ i
P
)− (1 + φ
2
γ
i
)γ
i
)
K
0
and P
0,i
= (χ
2
τ¯ i
P
A)
−χ
2 K
χ
1
−χ
2
0
, i = 0, 1.
Total welfare effect
The total welfare effect of the reform, as a percentage of output is: TWE = λC0,0
Y
0,0
×100,
where λ is computed from
∫
∞
0
e−θt
((1+λ)C
t,0
P
−η
t,0
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
dt =
∫
∞
0
e−θt
(C
t,1
P
−η
t,1
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
dt.
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Blue dividend
The value of the blue dividend, as a percentage of output, is BD =
ωC
0,0
Y
0,0
× 100, where
ω is computed from
∫
∞
0
e−θt
((1+ω)C
t,0
P
−η
t,0
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
dt =
∫
∞
0
e−θt
(C
t,1
P
−η
t,0
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
dt.
Green dividend
The value of the green dividend expressed as percentage on output is: GD = υC0,0
Y
0,0
×100,
where υ is computed from
∫
∞
0
e−θt
((1+υ)C
t,0
P
−η
t,0
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
dt =
∫
∞
0
e−θt
(C
t,0
P
−η
t,1
)
1−σ
−1
1−σ
dt.
If ω < 0 (υ < 0) then the blue (green) dividend does not emerge.
Computing the Pigouvian pollution tax
We compare the conditions characterizing the competitive equilibrium with the opti-
mality conditions for the central planner’s problem. The central planner solution is an
allocation {C
t
, K
t
, Z
t
}∞
t=0
that maximizes the lifetime utility of households, subject to the
aggregate constraint of resources [(6), together with K˙
t
= I
t
], and the pollution equation
(2).
The Euler condition is
σ
C˙
t
C
t
+ η(1− σ)
P˙
t
P
t
=
[
1
1 + φγ
(
A−
χ
1
χ
2
(
Z
t
K
t
)
P
+
φ
2
γ2
)
− θ
]
, (20)
where (
Z
t
K
t
)
P
=
ηχ
2
1 + ηχ
2
(
A− γ
(
1 + γ
φ
2
))
, (21)
with the P index standing for the planner’s solution.
31
37
The consumption to capital ratio is
(
C
t
K
t
)
P
=
1
1 + ηχ
2
(
A− γ
(
1 + γ
φ
2
))
. (22)
The first-best fiscal policy would allow for the efficient allocation of resources to be
attained as a competitive equilibrium. Therefore, in order to characterize the first-best
tax policy, we compare the growth rate, consumption and abatement ratios to capital for
the market solution with those for the central planner solution.
Comparing (1) and (7) with (20) and (21), and using (8), we obtain the Pigouvian
pollution and income tax rates: τ¯ ∗
P
= η
A
(
C
t
K
t
)
P
and τ ∗ = 0.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that if σ˜ > 1, the BGP of the planner’s prob-
lem also lacks transitional dynamics (applying the proof of proposition 1 to the solution
planner).
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